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NOTE
READING Too MUCH INTO REEDER-SIMCO?
Jeremy M. Suhr*
This Note argues that a careful analysis of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco
GMC, Inc. demonstrates that, despite the expansive dicta appear-
ing in part IV of that opinion, the Court did not intend to reshape
the course of its Robinson-Patman Act jurisprudence in any signifi-
cant way. The Court's opinion operated well within the confines of
established Robinson-Patman Act doctrine, even if its searching re-
view of the evidence presented at trial represented a rare foray into
the arena of factual error correction. After Reeder-Simco, however,
many commentators emphasized the dicta in part IV of the opinion
and argued that Reeder-Simco portended the end of a pillar of Rob-
inson-Patman Act doctrine, the Morton Salt Inference. In light of
the expansive interpretations that many commentators adopted af-
ter Reeder-Simco, this Note surveys citations to the opinion to
determine whether such broad readings of the case have taken hold
in the lower courts as well. The results show that courts have gen-
erally read the opinion narrowly and continue to apply the Morton
Salt Inference in secondary-line Robinson-Patman Act cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act of 1936 ("RPA")' has
long stood out awkwardly among the collection of statutes generally re-
ferred to as the Antitrust laws. Passed amid the turmoil of the Great
Depression, the RPA reflects different values than those embodied in the
rest of antitrust law.3 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "[t]he
antitrust laws ... were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not com-
petitors' ,4 and that "[i]nterbrand competition ... is the primary concern of
antitrust law.' 5 In discussing the RPA, however, the Court has long noted
that it has a "prophylactic purpose ' 6 and that "in enacting the Robinson-
Patman Act, Congress was especially concerned with protecting small busi-
nesses.' 7 To achieve this end, Congress drafted the RPA8 to broaden and re-
define the Clayton Act's "injury to competition" language to permit "a find-
ing of injury to competition by a showing of 'injury to the competitor
victimized by the discrimination.' "9
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
2. John B. Kirkwood, The Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare: Has Volvo Recon-
ciled Them?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349, 349 (2007) ("The Robinson-Patman Act is the black
sheep of antitrust."). See generally The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000);
Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2000). The RPA itself is technically
an amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 837
F.2d 1127, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
3. See Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 528-29 (1 st Cir. 1989)
(Breyer, J.) ("Unlike the Sherman Act, which protects 'competition, not competitors,' the Robinson-
Patman Act extends its protection to competitors.... [Tihe Act protects those who compete with a
favored seller, not just the overall competitive process.") (citation omitted).
4. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
5. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
6. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983).
7. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49 (1948). The Court has also
observed that the RPA "was passed in response to the problem perceived in the increased market
power and coercive practices of chainstores and other big buyers that threatened the existence of
small independent retailers." Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 440 U.S. 69, 75-76
(1979).
8. In relevant part, the RPA provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce... and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
9. Morton Salt, 343 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 74-1502, at 4
(1936)).
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The RPA provides a cause of action against essentially two major kinds
of competitive injury that might result from acts of price-discrimination: (1)
claims alleging injury at the primary-line, and (2) those alleging injury at the
secondary-line.'0 Primary-line cases involve conduct, generally predatory
pricing, that injures competition at the level of the discriminating seller and
its direct competitors." Secondary-line cases, the majority of RPA claims
and the central concern of the act, 2 "involve price discrimination that injures
competition among the discriminating seller's customers... [and] cases in
this category typically refer to 'favored' and 'disfavored' purchasers."'3 Such
secondary-line discrimination occurs when a seller favors some of its cus-
tomers over others. For example, a small "disfavored" grocery store would
have a garden variety secondary-line claim when a supplier grants larger
discounts to a giant "favored" national grocery store than it grants to the
smaller store.1
4
In 1948 the Court set forth a relatively plaintiff-friendly test for finding
the required injury to competition in the secondary-line context. In Federal
Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co.," the Court announced the principle,
since known as the "Morton Salt Inference," that "an injury to competition
may be inferred from evidence that some purchasers had to pay their sup-
plier 'substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to
pay.' ,16 Under the Morton Salt Inference, therefore, secondary-line plaintiffs
'7may satisfy the "injury to competition" requirement of every RPA claim
simply by showing that the defendant-seller had given substantially lower
prices to a "favored" rival purchaser over a substantial period of time. Thus,
while antitrust law generally protects "competition, not competitors,"'8
10. The RPA provides a cause of action against a third kind of injury as well. These
"[tlertiary-line cases involve injury to competition at the level of the purchaser's customers." Volvo
Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 176 (2006).
11. Id.
12. Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., Ill F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Congress'
concern for the fate of individual competitors.., focussed [sic] on secondary-line, not primary-line
competition. Since the original Clayton Act addressed only primary-line injury, Congress passed the
Robinson-Patman Act to add protection against secondary-line injury, more specifically against
injury to small retailers.") (citations omitted); see also Thomas E. Kauper, The Report of the Attor-
ney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws: A Retrospective, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1867, 1883 (2002) ("The primary concern of the Robinson-Patman Act is with injury at the level of
the favored and disfavored buyers.").
13. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 176.
14. E.g., United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
15. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
16. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 559 (1990) (quoting Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S.
at 46-47).
17. RPA plaintiffs must also show that (1) the relevant sales were made in interstate com-
merce; (2) the goods were of "'like grade and quality' "; and (3) the seller discriminated in price
between the plaintiff and another purchaser. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 176 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (2000)).
18. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
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courts have long noted that the RPA's "statutory language and the legislative
history both show that Congress" in this instance adopted a "policy of pro-
tecting individual merchants as a means of protecting competition."'9
Indeed, in 1983 the Court reaffirmed the Morton Salt Inference of injury to
competition via evidence of injury to a competitor, although it also held that
defendants may "overcome" that presumption by introducing "evidence
breaking the causal connection between a price differential and lost sales or
profits."2 °
While acknowledging the uniqueness of the RPA, the Supreme Court
and lower courts have nonetheless struggled with how to treat the RPA in
light of the policies underlying the rest of antitrust law. Indeed, the Court
has described one prior case as suggesting "that as a general rule the
Robinson-Patman Act should be construed so as to insure its coherence with
'the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress.' ,21
More recently, in considering a primary-line predatory pricing claim in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,22 the Court ex-
plicitly adopted a construction of the RPA that synthesized the standard used
for such primary-line RPA claims with that used for similar predatory pric-
ing claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act.23 The Court held that below-
cost pricing was an element to recovery for predatory pricing claims under
both section 2 and the RPA because low prices are "in general a boon to
consumers" and plaintiffs must therefore show that a defendant's below-cost
pricing "would likely injure competition in the relevant market. 24 Finally,
the Court again declared that "'the Robinson-Patman Act should be con-
strued consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.' ,25
Despite such expansive language in Brooke Group about construing the
RPA consistently with broader antitrust polices, lower courts have generally
continued to treat secondary-line cases differently and have applied the
Morton Salt Inference. Even though the Morton Salt Inference-by treating
injury to a competitor as sufficient to presume injury to competition-runs
contrary to the general thrust of antitrust law, at least four circuits have af-
19. Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., 111 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1997); see also
Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.).
20. Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983).
21. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 458 (1978) (quoting Automatic Can-
teen Co. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 346 U.S. 61,74 (1953)).
22. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
23. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 ("[Wihether the claim alleges predatory pricing under § 2
of the Sherman Act or primary-line price discrimination under the [RPA], two prerequisites to re-
covery remain the same."). First, the Court stated that § 2 or RPA claims "seeking to establish
competitive injury resulting from a rival's low prices must prove that the prices complained of are
below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs." Id. Second, such claims must "demonstrat[e] that
the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability,
of recouping its investment in below-cost prices." Id. at 224.
24. Id. at 224, 225 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 220 (quoting Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 440 U.S. 69, 80
n.13 (1979)).
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26
firmed its continued viability post-Brooke Group. Likewise, at least two
district courts have continued to apply the Morton Salt Inference in secon-
dary-line RPA cases after Brooke Group.2
7
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in March
200528 in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.
("Reeder-Simco") 9 reasonably raised questions as to whether the Court in-
tended to eliminate the Morton Salt Inference, as some commentators had
suggested.0 After all, the secondary-line RPA plaintiff in Reeder-Simco had
prevailed in a jury trial, with the jury instructed on the Morton Salt Infer-
31
ence.
When the Court overturned the plaintiff's judgment in Reeder-Simco,
commentators already hostile to the RPA and Morton Salt greeted the
26. George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 148 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir 1998)
(noting that "'the holding of the Brooke Group opinion on its face applies only to primary-line
cases, not secondary-line cases'" and that "'given the legislative history and statutory language
distinctions, we will not presume, without more guidance, that the Supreme Court intended in
Brooke Group to alter the well-established rule that it adopted in Morton Salt'" (quoting Coastal
Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petrol. Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 193 (1 st Cir. 1996))); Chroma Lighting v.
GTE Prods. Corp., Ill F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1997) ("We decline to extend the reasoning of
Brooke Group to secondary-line cases because of the significant differences between primary- and
secondary-line claims."); Coastal Fuels of P.R., 79 F.3d at 193 ("[W]e hold that the Morton Salt rule
continues to apply to secondary-line injury cases such as the present one."); Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v.
Tarmac Roofing Sys., 63 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (3d Cir. 1995) (continuing to apply the Morton Salt
Inference in a secondary-line price discrimination case under the RPA after Brooke Group). For a
case prior to Brooke Group that nonetheless adopted a very restrictive view of the effect of the
Morton Salt Inference, see Boise Cascade Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 837 F.2d 1127, 1144 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (holding that the Morton Salt Inference can be overcome by "evidence showing an ab-
sence of competitive injury" (emphasis omitted)).
27. Indus. Burner Sys., Inc. v. Maxon Corp., 275 E Supp. 2d 878, 887 n.21 (E.D. Mich.
2003) ("[T]his court... concludes that the Sixth Circuit would not extend the reach of Brooke
Group beyond primary-line cases."); Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 626, 652 (S.D. Tex.
1999) (concluding that the Fifth Circuit would follow the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits in
retaining the Morton Salt inference in secondary-line cases and limiting Brooke Group to primary-
line cases).
28. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 544 U.S. 903 (2005).
29. 546 U.S. 164 (2006).
30. E.g., Paul H. LaRue, Robinson-Patman Act in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Morton
Salt Rule be Retired?, 48 SMU L. REV. 1917 (1995). This prospect seemed increasingly likely given
the Court's nearly contemporaneous grant of certiorari, in June 2005, in another antitrust case, Inde-
pendent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 545 U.S.
1127 (2005). In the opinion below in Illinois Tool, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had
grudgingly applied an unrelated but similarly long-standing doctrine while noting that "[tlhe time
may have come to abandon the doctrine, but it is up to the Congress or the Supreme Court to make
this judgment." Id. at 1351 (discussing the doctrine announced in International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), that, in assessing the legality of tying arrangements that involve
patented or copyrighted tying products, courts should presume that a defendant enjoys market
power). The Supreme Court duly accepted this invitation in its opinion in Illinois Tool, issued just
weeks after its decision in Reeder-Sinco. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46
(2006) (rejecting the International Salt presumption and "hold[ing] that, in all cases involving a
tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying prod-
uct").




opinion with glee,32 with one article describing it as "[p]lac[ing the] Robinson-
Putman Act on Life Support."3  Commentators expressed such sentiment even
though Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Reeder-Simco did not re-
ject or even criticize the Morton Salt Inference. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg
even cited Morton Salt in reiterating that the Court has "recognized that a
permissible inference of competitive injury may arise from evidence that a
favored competitor received a significant price reduction over a substantial
period of time." 3 Certainly, the Court provided commentators with some
cause to read the opinion as sharply curtailing the reach of the RPA: Reeder-
Simco added another line to the refrain, already voiced in Brooke Group and
prior cases, that the Court would "continue to construe the [RPA] 'consis-
tently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.' , The Court also quoted
the landmark case of Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. in asserting
that "[i]nterbrand competition, our opinions affirm, is the 'primary concern
of antitrust law.' ,,36
While the appearance of such language in a secondary-line RPA case• • 37
might seem significant, these passages were plainly dicta. The language
quoted above, and seized upon by opponents of the RPA, appeared only af-
ter the Court had already reexamined the evidence presented at trial.3' The
Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to show that "Volvo sold at a
lower price to Reeder's 'competitors'" given the customer-specific competi-
tive-bidding situation at issue.39 On balance, one would not expect the Court
to reject in dicta a doctrine central to the RPA, first adopted in 1948 and
affirmed repeatedly since then. Rather, the Court would be far more likely to
confront the doctrine head-on and offer a clear and reasoned articulation for
its rejection. 0
This Note argues that Reeder-Simco effected relatively little change to
RPA doctrine, contrary to the broad interpretations adopted by many com-
mentators. Part I closely analyzes the Court's opinion in Reeder-Simco and
argues that the best reading of the opinion is a narrow one. Part II then sur-
veys the commentary and cases that have appeared since Reeder-Simco,
32. E.g., Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Supreme Court Places Robinson-Patman Act on
Life Support, N.Y L.J., Feb. 21, 2006, at 3.
33. Id.
34. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 177.
35. Id. at 181 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220
(1993)).
36. Id. at 180 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)).
37. See Richard M. Steuer, Volvo Trucks v. Reeder-Simco: Bidding for a Rational Robinson-
Patman Act, ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 61, 66 (describing the Court as "adopti[ng] Brooke Group
in the context of a secondary line case").
38. See Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 178-8 1.
39. Id. at 179; see also infra Part I.A.
40. Cf Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33-46 (2006) (rejecting the In-
ternational Salt presumption that patents confer market power in a tying arrangement after
"undertak[ing] a fresh examination of the history of both the judicial and legislative appraisals of
tying arrangements").
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finding that courts have generally interpreted Reeder-Simco narrowly, de-
spite the defense bar's initial predictions that Reeder-Simco had all but
sounded the death knell of the Morton Salt Inference and the RPA more
generally. The Note concludes that the results of this survey further support
the narrow interpretation of Reeder-Simco advocated in Part I.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN REEDER-SIMCO DID NOT REJECT
THE MORTON SALT INFERENCE AND SHOULD BE READ NARROWLY
This Part analyzes the Court's opinion in Reeder-Simco and argues that
it should be read narrowly, despite dicta in Part IV of the opinion echoing
Brooke Group. Section L.A details the unique market situation at issue in
Reeder-Simco and the plaintiff's allegations. Section I.B then scrutinizes the
Court's opinion and argues that several factors-among them the limited
nature of the Court's holding, the citation to Morton Salt, and the absence of
any substantial debate regarding the viability of the Inference in the secon-
dary-line context in both the Court's opinion and the parties' briefing-all
suggest that Reeder-Simco should be read narrowly.
A. Just the Facts: What Reeder-Simco Is Actually About
To understand the circumscribed nature of the Court's holding in
Reeder-Simco requires a careful appreciation of its facts and how the market
at issue in Reeder-Simco differed from the market structure of a prototypical
secondary-line RPA case. Such a typical case might involve a disfavored
small retailer complaining that a seller has granted lower prices to a favored
rival of the small retailer. In such situations, the favored and disfavored re-
tailers have already purchased the defendant-seller's goods, which they then
compete against one another to resell. As demonstrated below, the market in
Reeder-Simco operated differently and involved minimal or no direct com-
petition among a manufacturer's dealers, which explains why the Court
found that Reeder-Simco's claim failed.
The market for specially ordered heavy-duty trucks-the product at is-
sue in Reeder-Simco-uses a competitive bidding proces!. driven by
customer specifications.4 ' In this market, retail customers-generally busi-
42nesses such as trucking firms or dairies purchasing fleets of trucks -
provide specifications, invite competitive bids from dealers associated with
truck manufacturers, and then purchase the trucks from the dealer offering
the best bid.43 Upon receiving the customer's specifications, Volvo dealers
such as Reeder-Simco approach Volvo to request discounts, or "conces-
sions," off the wholesale price of Volvo's trucks." The "common practice"
in the industry is for a truck manufacturer such as Volvo to offer
41. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 170.
42. See id. at 171-172.
43. Id. at 170-71; see also Kirkwood, supra note 2, at 352.
44. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 170.
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customer-specific discounts to their dealers, deciding on a case-by-case ba-
sis whether to offer a discount and, if so, at what rate. In setting the
discount rate, Volvo considers "such factors as industry-wide demand and
whether the retail customer has, historically, purchased a different brand of
trucks. 46 Once Volvo determines how great a discount, if any, it is prepared
to offer to a given dealer, the dealer uses that informatiofn in submitting its
bid to the customer.47 A dealer then purchases "trucks from Volvo only if and
when the retail customer accepts its bid.
' 48
During the period relevant to the case, Volvo had approximately 150
dealers, each assigned to a geographic territory. 9 Reeder-Simco was one
such dealer, and its territory consisted of ten counties in Arkansas and two in
Oklahoma.0 Although Volvo did not prohibit its dealers from bidding
against one another or from bidding outside their territories, Reeder-Simco
"rarely bid against another Volvo dealer."" On those rare occasions when a
retail customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo dealer, "Volvo's
stated policy was to provide the same price concession to each dealer com-
peting head to head for the same sale. 52
In 1997, Volvo announced a program called "Volvo Vision," which set
forth a new strategy to confront its problems in the market, including its
assessment that it had too many dealers. 3 Volvo projected reducing the
number of its dealers from 146 to seventy-five and increasing the size of the
remaining dealers' territories.5 4 Around this time, Reeder-Simco learned that
Volvo had granted another of its dealers a price concession greater than
those that Reeder-Simco typically received, leading Reeder-Simco to sus-
pect that it was one of the dealers Volvo was seeking to eliminate.5 5 In
February 2000, Reeder-Simco filed suit against Volvo, claiming losses re-
sulting from Volvo's alleged violations of the Arkansas Franchise Practices
Act and the RPA.56 The gravamen of Reeder-Simco's RPA complaint was
that Volvo had violated the RPA by offering its other dealers better conces-
sions than it gave Reeder-Simco, putting it at a competitive disadvantage. 7
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 170-71.









57. See Margaret M. Zwisler, Volvo Trucks v. Reeder-Simco: Judicial Activism at the Su-
preme Court?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 40, 40.
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Volvo and Reeder-Simco took their dispute to trial-a rare occurrence in
antitrust cases -- where a jury "found that there was a reasonable possibility
that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition between Reeder
and other Volvo truck dealers, and that Volvo's discriminatory pricing in-
jured Reeder."59 The jury found that Reeder-Simco sustained damages in
excess of $1.3 million as a result of Volvo's RPA violation. 60 After denying
Volvo's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the District Court trebled
the damages on the RPA claim and entered judgment.6'
On appeal, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting
Volvo's argument that competitive bidding situations do not give rise to RPA
claims. 62 The Eighth Circuit further determined that a jury could reasonably
have found that Reeder-Simco did compete with other favored Volvo dealers
and that a jury could properly have found competitive injury from the evi-
dence that Reeder-Simco presented at trial.63 That evidence primarily
compared the concessions that Volvo offered Reeder-Simco, when it bid
against non-Volvo dealers, with the concessions that Volvo offered to other
Volvo dealers similarly bidding against non-Volvo dealers for other sales.
64
Reeder-Simco presented evidence that, during the entire five-year period it
was an authorized Volvo dealer, it had bid against other Volvo dealers for a
particular sale only twice.6' Further, in one of those instances, neither Volvo
dealer won the bid.66 In the other, Volvo offered the same concession to both
Reeder-Simco and Southwest Missouri Truck Center, a rival Volvo dealer,
but the customer chose Southwest Missouri based on prior dealing with
them. 61 Only later, after the customer selected Reeder-Simco's rival and in-
sisted on a lower price, did Volvo increase the discount it gave to Southwest
651Missouri.
Judge Hansen dissented from the court of appeals' opinion with respect
to the RPA claim, reasoning that Reeder-Simco had failed to prove that it
had actually competed with other Volvo dealers at the time of purchase for
58. Id. at 41 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005, at 182
tbl.C-4 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/c4.pdf) (noting that
only 4.8% of antitrust cases terminated by trial in fiscal year 2005).
59. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 173.
60. Id. In addition, the jury found that Volvo had violated the Arkansas Franchise Practices
Act and awarded damages of $513,750, but that portion of the judgment was not appealed. Id. at n.2.
61. Id. at 173.
62. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701, 708-09 (8th
Cir. 2004), rev.'d sub nam. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. 164.
63. Id. at 709.
64. Id. at 706-07.
65. Id. at 705, 708-09.





the same customers and thus could not demonstrate competitive injury.69 In
its appeal to the Supreme Court, Volvo framed the case as presenting the
question whether "a manufacturer [may] be held liable for secondary-line
price discrimination under the [RPA] in the absence of a showing that the
manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product
to the same retail customer.
' 70
B. Why Reeder-Simco Should Be Read Narrowly
This Section advances two primary reasons why Reeder-Simco should
be interpreted narrowly. First, the Court's careful consideration of the facts
presented above and the precise nature of its holding demonstrate that the
Court's opinion necessarily accepted the viability of the Morton Salt Infer-
ence. In conducting its searching review of the evidence, the Court itself
continued to credit the Inference as a "permissible" means of showing com-
petitive injury. Second, neither the Court nor the parties engaged in any
sustained analysis as to retaining or rejecting the Inference. The absence of
such analysis casts great doubt on expansive readings of the case that sug-
gest the Court did away with the Inference entirely.
71
First, the intense scrutiny to which the Court subjected the evidence pre-
sented at trial amounted to an 6ffective endorsement of the Morton Salt
Inference. Given the facts recited in Section L.A, 72 Reeder-Simco presented a
question that, in some sense, related to market definition for RPA claims.
The Court has traditionally understood the RPA's statutory text73 and the
Morton Salt Inference to apply only when plaintiffs prove that a seller has
carried out "substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers
over time., 74 Reeder-Simco forced the Court to answer the following ques-
tion: when should courts deem that two given purchasers are actual
competitors?
While in the typical secondary-line case this is often an easy question,
under the facts in Reeder-Simco, the question is not nearly so clear. For in-
stance, in a case where a small grocery store complains that a supplier has
given lower prices to one of its larger rivals, both grocery stores are likely
located in the same community and seek to serve roughly the same custom-
69. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 E3d at 718-19 (Hansen,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
70. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 175.
71. Cf, e.g., Simon A. Rodell, Case Comment, Antitrust Law: The Fall of the Morton Salt
Rule in Secondary-Line Price Discrimination Cases, 58 FLA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2006) (arguing that
the Court's language signals the end of the Morton Salt Inference).
72. See supra Section I.A.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful . . to discriminate in price between dif-
ferent purchasers of commodities... " (emphasis added)).
74. See Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983) (emphasis
added).
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ers.7 In contrast, the facts in Reeaer-Simco described a market composed of
a series of discrete transactions occurring across the country, involving
competitive bids submitted to individual customers, and almost never in-
cluding more than one Volvo dealer.16 Such a claim would be equivalent to a
small grocery store in northern Michigan complaining that Morton Salt was
offering lower prices on its salt to Super Wal-Mart grocery stores located in
Arizona or Florida. Even the most fervent supporters of the RPA would
likely find such a situation inappropriate for the RPA and the Inference."
The nature of the Court's evidentiary review thus amounted to an accep-
tance of the Inference itself. The Court scrutinized the evidence to determine
whether Reeder-Simco in fact competed with other Volvo dealers,7 8 and in
concluding that Reeder-Simco's RPA claim failed, it did not reject the pro-
priety of inferring harm to competition from harm to Reeder-Simco itself.
Rather, the Court rejected its claim because Reeder-Simco had simply failed
to show that it was entitled to benefit from the Inference because it had pre-
sented virtually no evidence of transactions or bids in which Volvo in fact
discriminated against it in favor of one of Reeder-Simco's rival Volvo deal-
ers.79 As the Court observed, even "if price discrimination between two
purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as to affect substan-
tially competition between Reeder and the 'favored' Volvo dealer.
' 80
Moreover, the Court conducted its searching evidentiary review to de-
termine whether Reeder-Simco actually competed with other Volvo dealers
only after approvingly quoting the Inference. In Part I of its opinion, the
Court briefly sketched the facts and procedural history of the case;8' then in
Part II it outlined the RPA's statutory text and the legal standards used to
evaluate RPA claims;" and, in Part III, it engaged in its careful scrutiny of
75. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 463 (1962) (noting, in a government
enforcement action, that defendants were "major distributors of fluid milk products in metropolitan
Chicago" and that they discriminated in price between independently owned grocery stores and
large grocery store chains in the area); see also Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimina-
tion and the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1060 (1999) (stating
that the RPA was "quite clearly" addressed to "Congressional concerns about injury to disfavored
purchasers occasioned by the successful efforts of competing power buyers to secure unjustified
price concessions from a common seller" (emphasis added)).
76. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 170-73 (2006).
77. The RPA's text simply proscribes "discriminat[ing] in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who ... knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them ...." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). If the two purchasers in question operate in entirely different markets
and do not compete in any way with each other, then price discrimination among those two purchas-
ers cannot "lessen competition" or "injure, destroy, or prevent" competition between them because
no such competition even exists between them.
78. See Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 178-80.
79. See id. at 180.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 170-75.
82. Id. at 175-77.
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the evidence presented at trial.8 3 In reviewing the legal requirements for es-
tablishing a secondary-line claim in Part II, the Court noted that of the four
elements, only two were in doubt: (1) whether Volvo had discriminated in
price between Reeder and another purchaser of Volvo trucks, and (2)
whether that discrimination caused an injury to competition.84 The Court
concluded its review of the legal standards in Part II by observing that
[a] hallmark of the requisite competitive injury, our decisions indicate, is
the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored
purchaser. We have also recognized that a permissible inference of com-
petitive injury may arise from evidence that a favored competitor received
a significant price reduction over a substantial period of time. See FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49-51 (1948); Falls City Industries, 460
U.S., at 435. Absent actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, how-
ever, Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury required under the
Act."
The legal framework that the Court set forth as controlling in Reeder-
Simco very clearly recognized and accepted that a "permissible" means of
proving injury to competition included reliance on the Morton Salt Infer-
ence-that injury to a competitor over time equates to an injury to
competition itself.
As the Court's final sentence in Part II indicated, the primary objective
of the factual inquiry that followed in Part III was, in essence, to determine
whether to apply the Inference. By its own terms, the Inference applies only
when a "favored competitor" receives a "significant price reduction over a
substantial period of time," and in Part III the Court thus conducted a careful
review of the evidence presented at trial to determine whether Reeder-Simco
had proven "actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer.
' ' 6
The Court reversed the judgment in favor of Reeder-Simco because its
review of the evidence in Part Ill simply showed that Reeder-Simco had
failed to prove that it actually competed against other Volvo dealers in re-
selling the trucks it purchased from Volvo.17 As the Court noted, "Reeder did
not establish that it was disfavored vis-A-vis other Volvo dealers in the rare
instances in which they competed for the same sale-let alone that the al-
leged discrimination was substantial. 8 1 In denying Reeder-Simco's claim,
the Court even couched its reasoning in the language traditionally used to
83. Id. at 177-80.
84. Id. at 176-77. The other two requirements were that the relevant Volvo truck sales were
made in interstate commerce and that the trucks were of "like grade and quality." Id.
85. Id. at 177 (some citations omitted).
86. Id. at 177, 177-80 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 177, 180; see also Zwisler, supra note 57, at 42 ("In reversing the Eighth Circuit,
the Supreme Court did not announce any new principle of law, or construe any provisions of the
[RPA], or reverse or limit Morton Salt. The Supreme Court simply held that Reeder's evidence was
insufficient to establish a violation of the [RPA].").
88. Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. at 180.
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formulate the Inference 89 and merely concluded that Reeder-Simco's evi-
dence failed to justify its use in this particular case.
Finding the Inference inappropriate as applied to a particular set of facts
seems an unlikely method of sounding its death knell. After all, as detailed
above, the custom-ordered heavy-duty truck market used a system of com-
petitive bidding and Volvo's dealers generally operated in different
geographic markets-a scenario that bears little relation to prototypical sec-
ondary-line RPA claims in which a disfavored small retail store complains
that a supplier has been offering lower prices to one of its larger competitors
in the area. Had the Court wished to place the viability of the Inference in
doubt, surely it would have directly confronted the merits of its continued
use rather than engaging in a lengthy and detailed factual inquiry that sim-
ply, and rather uncontroversially, found the Inference's application
unwarranted in a particular and fairly unique market setting.
The second reason that Reeder-Simco should not be read as calling the
existence of the Inference into doubt is that both the parties and the Court
devoted very little attention to questioning the merits of the Morton Salt
Inference. Although the parties' briefing did address the propriety of retain-
ing the Morton Salt Inference, on balance they devoted far more analysis to
other issues in the case and relegated the Morton Salt issue to concluding
arguments in the alternative. Certainly, attacks on the Inference were not
entirely absent in the case. The final argument included in Volvo's brief to
the Court described the Inference in Morton Salt as mere "dicta" and sug-
gested that the Court should use the case to harmonize secondary-line RPA
claims with the rest of antitrust law, just as the Court had harmonized pri-
mary-line claims in Brooke Group.90 In a similar vein, the Solicitor
General's brief, filed as amicus curiae supporting Volvo, briefly suggested
possible ways of cabining the effect of the Inference. 9' The Solicitor General
contended that the "Morton Salt inference should not be invoked blindly to
permit findings of [RPA] liability where a direct causal link between price
discrimination and competitive harm is lacking" and that "the inference is
warranted only to the extent that it yields generally valid predictions about
injury to competition. ' 92
As Respondent Reeder-Simco observed, however, Volvo had waived any
arguments attacking Morton Salt: "Not only did Volvo not raise it in the pe-
tition for certiorari, it did not object to the Morton Salt instruction at
trial .... Indeed, Volvo actually proposed a Morton Salt instruction prior to
89. See, e.g., Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983) (de-
scribing Morton Salt as holding that "for the purposes of [the RPAI, injury to competition is
established prima facie by proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers
over time").
90. Brief of the Petitioner Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. at 34, 32-44, Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S.
164 (No. 04-905), 2005 WL 1222880.
91. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25-26, Reeder-
Simco, 546 U.S. 164 (No. 04-905), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/3mer/lami/
2004-0905.mer.ami.pdf.
92. Id. at 25.
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trial."93 Noting that Volvo's arguments against Morton Salt "would require
overruling a slew of this Court's precedents," Reeder-Simco catalogued the
numerous occasions on which the Court had repeated and affirmed the In-
ference.94 Characterizing Volvo's arguments as an attempt to amend the RPA
judicially, Reeder-Simco reminded the Court that it "has long properly de-
ferred to the expressed intent of Congress."95
The Morton Salt issue received very little attention in the oral argument
as well. Counsel for Volvo omitted any mention of Morton Salt,96 focusing
purely on the evidentiary point that Reeder-Simco had failed to prove that
Volvo discriminated against it in any head-to-head bidding situation in favor
of other rival Volvo dealers. Deputy Solicitor General Thomas Hungar, ap-
pearing for the United States in support of Volvo, referenced Morton Salt a
handful of times but almost always in the context of whether or not the
plaintiff in this case or a given hypothetical case had met the elements of a
typical secondary-line RPA claim. Indeed, at one point he acknowledged
that "price discrimination between competing purchasers... is what this
Court, in the Morton Salt case and in other cases, have [sic] indicated the
[RPA] was aimed at.' 97 Rather than attacking the Inference, his argument
merely contested the lower courts' findings that Reeder-Simco was "in some
sense, in competition with other Volvo dealers" because the evidence indi-
cated that "at the point that the price discrimination occurs, they are not
[actually in competition with other Volvo dealers]."98
Counsel for Reeder-Simco did reference the questions raised in the
briefing about the Morton Salt Inference, and the justices did not seem in-
terested in debating the merits of overturning Morton Salt. Reeder-Simco's
counsel noted that the Court had reaffirmed the Inference in the 1980s and
again in 1990, contending that "that principle ought to be completely settled
at this stage" and that "[i]f there's to be any fix there, it ought to be a fix
that's offered up by Congress.' 99 Several unrelated questions and responses
later, Justice Breyer then broke into the conversation and mused that he
could "tell a little story there that would be quite consistent with the pur-
poses of the antitrust law. So we follow that approach in this case and say
goodbye to Morton Salt, because Morton Salt, after all, was.., quite for-
malistic .... So, what do you think of that?"' ° Reeder-Simco's counsel
offered the straight-forward response that he was not before the Court "as an
93. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 35, Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. 164 (No. 04-905), 2005
WL 1801037.
94. Id. at 36-38.
95. Id. at 42.
96. See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 3-18, 53-56, Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. 164 (No. 04-
905), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-905.pdf.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45-46.
100. Id. at 51; see generally id. at 50-52.
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advocate for overturning Morton Salt, for obvious reasons,"'0 ' and the re-
mainder of the argument-including Volvo's rebuttal-contained no further
mention of Morton Salt.°2
Had the Court intended to use Reeder-Simco as its vehicle for doing
away with the Morton Salt Inference and rewriting its understanding of the
RPA, surely it would have considered the question in far greater detail than
the scant few references detailed above. Combined with the very limited,
circumscribed nature of the Court's holding-that evidence of only two in-
stances of head-to-head competition between Reeder-Simco and another
Volvo dealer failed to prove that Volvo had discriminated against Reeder-
Simco in favor of other Volvo dealers-the limited analysis regarding the
desirability of retaining the Inference suggests that the case should be inter-
preted narrowly. Far from revolutionizing the standard in secondary-line
cases, as Brooke Group had in primary-line cases, the Court essentially re-
solved Reeder-Simco on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. As one
commentator has noted, the Court "simply held that Reeder's evidence was
insufficient to establish a violation of the [RPA]."' 3
II. A SURVEY OF CITATIONS TO REEDER-SIMCO: WHILE COMMENTATORS
HAVE CONSTRUED IT BROADLY, LOWER COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED
REEDER-SIMCO NARROWLY AND CONTINUE TO EMBRACE
THE MORTON SALT INFERENCE
In the fifteen months after the Court decided Reeder-Simco, its opinion• • 104
garnered relatively few citations. Nonetheless, those references follow a
clear trend: after surveying citations to Reeder-Simco by commentators and
courts, this Part concludes that, while commentators have frequently hailed
101. Id.at52.
102. See id. at 52-56.
103. Zwisler, supra note 57, at 42.
104. In performing this survey, I used Westlaw's "Citing References" feature for Volvo Trucks
North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006). As of August 20, 2007, a
total of 188 results appear, but only 16 are cases. Of these, some cite Reeder-Simco only in passing
or for an unrelated point of law. See, e.g., B-S Steel of Kan., Inc. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 439 F.3d 653,
668-69 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Reeder-Simco on an issue of dam-
ages calculation and simply noting that the Supreme Court had reversed the judgment on other
grounds); World Wrestling Entm't, Inc. v. Jakks Pac., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 484, 501, 502, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Reeder-Simco, in a case involving claims of discriminatory licensing, twice
for historical context of the RPA and once noting that the RPA relates to transactions involving
goods); PSW, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., No. C.A. 04-347T, 2006 WL 519670, at *4 (D.R.I. Feb. 28,
2006) (citing Reeder-Simco, in a case involving an abandoned RPA claim brought by a processor of
internet credit card transactions against Visa, for the proposition that the RPA applies only to dis-
crimination committed by sellers of "commodities"). Finally, a majority of citations to Reeder-
Simco are cursory explanatory references appearing in various encyclopedias or treatises. See, e.g., 3
FREDERICK K. GRITTNER & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
§ 3051 (3d ed. Supp. 2006) ("The Supreme Court, in Volvo Trucks North America Inc. v. Reeder-
Simco GMC, Inc., ruled that a manufacturer may not be held liable for secondary-line price dis-
crimination in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers
competing to resell its product to the same retail customer." (footnote omitted)); 2 W. MICHAEL
GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 11:36, at 11-89 (2006).
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Reeder-Simco as significantly curtailing the RPA, courts have overwhelm-
ingly read Reeder-Simco as effecting little or no change to the doctrine at
all. This Part first discusses the reactions of commentators who have read
the opinion broadly, and it then examines how a minority of commentators
and nearly all lower courts have viewed the case more narrowly.
Commentators have almost universally argued that Reeder-Simco radi-
cally reshaped the law of secondary-line RPA claims, much as Brooke
Group changed primary-line claims. For instance, after noting that lower
courts have continued to rely on Morton Salt as good law in the secondary-
line context after Brooke Group, one commentator observed that "[d]icta in
the Supreme Court's 2006 Volvo Trucks decision may reopen the question
whether injury to a competitor, without more, is sufficient to satisfy the act's
competitive injury requirement."'0 5 Another commentator declared that "the
Court's emphatic language establishing inter-brand competition as the pri-
mary concern of the RPA portends the end of the Morton Salt inference,"
concluding that in Reeder-Simco the Court had "retir[ed] the Morton Salt
rule. ' °6 Yet another pronounced that "although the majority gave a nod to
the Morton Salt inference," the Court's opinion in Reeder-Simco had
"adopt[ed] ... Brooke Group in the context of a secondary line case."' '7 As a
result, that commentator contended that "the Robinson-Patman
Act... plainly is a shadow of what it was before Volvo, when courts in six
circuits refused to apply Brooke Group's injury to competition standard be-
yond primary line cases.' ' 8
A minority of commentators shared these general sentiments but also of-
fered slightly more nuanced interpretations. For instance, while contending
that the Court had placed the RPA on "life support," the authors of one short
article nonetheless recognized that the Court continued to credit the Morton
Salt Inference and characterized the Court's opinion as "explain[ing] that
Reeder did not meet the Morton Salt presumption based on the evidence
presented."'' 9 Others observed that while the Court's "holding is narrow in
its application to 'competitive bidding' and 'special order' situations, as op-
posed to far more common situations of dealers reselling standardized goods
from their own inventories," the Court's dicta and quotations from
105. CHRISTOPHER J. MAcAvoY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELLING AND BUYING § 3.15 (Philip F.
Zeidman ed., 3d ed. Supp. 2006); see also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1193, 1208 & n.66 (2007) (reviewing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCI-
PLE AND EXECUTION (2005)) (suggesting that in Reeder-Simco the Court "arguably followed" a
prominent antitrust commentator's "recommendation that the courts read a competitive injury re-
quirement into the statute").
106. Rodell, supra note 71, at 975.
107. Steuer, supra note 37, at 64, 66.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 32, at 3.
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GTE Sylvania and Brooke Group would provide "fodder for future RP de-
fendants in a variety of other cases to argue about broad implications.""
Two final commentators, however, interpreted Reeder-Simco far more
narrowly. Whereas the commentators quoted above adopted relatively ex-
pansive interpretations of Reeder-Simco and generally emphasized the dicta
in Part IV of the opinion,"' the "narrow view" commentators reached their
conclusions after examining and highlighting the substance of the Court's
evidentiary analysis earlier in the opinion. Thus, while Margaret Zwisler
expressed a generally pessimistic outlook regarding the likely fallout from
the decision, ' 2 her review of the Court's evidentiary inquiry led her to un-
derstand the opinion itself as "simply h[olding] that Reeder's evidence was
insufficient" to establish an RPA violation and to describe the opinion as
"not announc[ing] any new principle of law" or "revers[ing] or limit[ing]
Morton Salt.""' 3
Professor John Kirkwood likewise adopted a narrow interpretation after
carefully analyzing the body of the Court's opinion in Reeder-Simco."4 He
attempted to explain the expansive dicta in Part IV by suggesting that the
Court merely meant to express that where some ambiguity exists in the
RPA-for instance, in its application to a competitive bidding scenario-it
would resolve those ambiguities "in ways that promote competition.""' Ul-
timately, he concluded that Reeder-Simco did not work a "radical shift in
[RPA] law"; instead, his view is that the Court's opinion "seems to convey a
more modest message" of resolving ambiguities in favor of procompetitive
interpretations of the Act and that "the Court does not appear willing to dis-
regard the fundamental features of the Act Congress passed in 1936."
' ' 
'6
In contrast to the majority of commentators, lower courts have treated
Reeder-Simco as leaving the status of RPA doctrine largely unchanged. For
instance, four lower court cases-Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co. Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,' 8 Video
110. Elaine Foreman & Robert Skitol, Volvo v. Reeder: Narrow Holding, Broad Implications,
THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006, at 1, http://www.abanet.orglantitrustlat-source/06/03/MarO6-
Skitol3=22f.pdf.
111. For another example of this phenomenon, see Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus
Curiae and Brief of CTIA - The Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10,
16, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007
WL 160782 (citing Reeder-Simco twice, on one occasion following a quotation from GTE Sylvania
and on the other following a quotation from Brooke Group).
112. Zwisler, supra note 57, at 43 (stating that "[t]he Court's somewhat tortured path to pre-
clude Reeder's suit will, no doubt, have the effect of limiting the reach of the [RPA] in many
circumstances).
113. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
114. Kirkwood, supra note 2, at 368-74.
115. Id. at 374.
116. Id.
117. No. 02-2197 (DMC), 2007 WL 419285 (D.N.J. Jan. 31,2007).
118. No. 02-4373, 2006 WL 2385519 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16,2006).
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Services Of America, Inc. v. Maxell Corp. of America, "9 and Feesers Inc. v.120
Michael Foods Inc. -have quoted Reeder-Simco itself in formulating the
Morton Salt Inference. ' Indeed, Danvers even described the Court as hav-
ing "recently reiterated" that the Morton Salt Inference may show the
required "competitive injury."' 2  Although Toledo Mack ultimately dismissed
the plaintiff's RPA claim, it did so because the plaintiff, like Reeder-Simco
itself, brought its claim in the context of another market characterized by
competitive bidding. '2 The Toledo Mack plaintiff similarly failed to offer-
and perhaps lacked any-proof of head-to-head bids between itself and any
other allegedly favored Mack Truck dealer.124 In Wiegand Mack Sales & Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., however, Judge Buckwalter, the same Judge
who dismissed the RPA claim in Toledo Mack, denied Mack Truck's motion
for summary judgment against another RPA plaintiff because its claim did
rely upon "direct evidence of price discrimination involving head-to-head
competition between Plaintiffs and a favored Mack dealer.""' Furthermore,
after noting that "[c]ompetitive injury can be shown in two ways," Judge
Buckwalter formulated the Morton Salt Inference by quoting from J.F
Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-a-Portion, Inc., a Third Circuit case that strongly en-
dorsed the Morton Salt Court's view of the RPA and its legislative history.
26
Other lower courts have also cited Reeder-Simco while continuing to
find the Morton Salt Inference viable. For example, the district court in
Monsieur Touton Selection v. Future Brands, LLC ' cited Reeder-Simco
twice for general propositions of RPA law and formulated the Morton Salt
Inference by citing to George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc.,"' a
Second Circuit case that reaffirmed the Inference and explicitly limited the
effect of Brooke Group to primary-line cases. 29 Further, two recent casesdecided by the Sixth Circuit that cited to Reeder-Simco-Smith Wholesale
119. No. 04-2594 (KSH), 2007 WL 2156359 (D.N.J. July 26, 2007).
120. No. 06-2661, 2007 WL 2302286 (3d Cir. Aug. 14,2007).
121. Danvers Motor Co., 2007 WL 419285, at * 11 ("[Als the Supreme Court recently reiter-
ated, 'a permissible inference of competitive injury may arise from evidence that a favored
competitor received a significant price reduction over a substantial period of time."' (quoting Volvo
Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 176 (2006))); Toledo Mack, 2006
WL 2385519, at *2 (quoting same language from Reeder-Simco); Maxell Corp., 2007 WL 2156359,
at *7 (quoting same language from Reeder-Simco); Feesers, 2007 WL 2302286, at *5 n.8 (quoting
same language from Reeder-Simco).
122. Danvers Motor Co., 2007 WL419285. at *11.
123. Toledo Mack, 2006 WL 2385519, at *3-4.
124. Id.
125. Wiegand Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., No. Civ. A. 03-5451, 2006
WL 847557, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2006).
126. Id. at *I (citing J.F. Feeser v. Serve-a-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1535 (3d Cir. 1990)).
127. No. 06 Civ. 1124(SAS), 2006 WL2192790 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006).
128. 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
129. Monsieur Touton, 2006 WL 2192790, at *4 (citing George Haug, 148 F.3d at 142-44);
see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'3" and Smith Wholesale Co. v. Philip
Morris USA"'-also continued to accept the Inference. In R.J. Reynolds, the
court accepted the Inference in noting that "it is well established, in the con-
text of quantity discounts, that an inference of competitive injury arises from
'evidence that some purchasers had to pay their supplier 'substantially more
for their goods than their competitors had to pay.' """
While the Sixth Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment for the
defendant in both cases, its opinions did not expansively interpret Reeder-
Simco's dicta about "interbrand competition" and the need to construe the
RPA consistently with broader antitrust polices-though, to be sure, both
opinions did cite that language.' Instead, the court denied the RPA claims
because the plaintiffs had attacked large cigarette manufacturers' incentive-
based discount programs that calculated its wholesalers' discount price by
using market share-not quantity of product ordered, as in Morton Salt 34
As the court explained, "market-share discount pricing structures present
different concerns than volume-based discounts" because such programs
"theoretically level the playing field by allowing competing purchasers of
like commodities to participate on equal terms, regardless of size, because
such discounts depend not on volume purchases, but on the percentage of
purchases of a particular category of products.' 35 Citing evidence demon-
strating that the defendants' programs frequently allowed small dealers to
qualify for the highest discount rate based upon their own purchase percent-
ages, 3 6 the court concluded that, under the longstanding "functional[]
availab[ility]" doctrine, the defendants' programs were "offered to all
wholesalers using a non-discriminatory formula."' 3 7 Therefore, the plaintiffs'
claims failed because they had not established price discrimination at all.
13 8
In sum, a majority of commentators greeted Reeder-Simco as signaling a
major shift in the Court's RPA jurisprudence. However, no such shift has
occurred. Instead, lower courts have agreed with this Note and a minority of
commentators that the substance of Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court
in Reeder-Simco recognizes the continued vitality of the Morton Salt Infer-
ence, despite somewhat narrowing the RPA's application in one particular
market setting.
130. 477 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2007).
131. 219 F. App'x 398 (6th Cir. 2007).
132. R.J. Reynolds, 477 F.3d at 864 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 559
(1990) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948))); see also
Philip Morris, 219 F. App'x at 404 ("We adopt and incorporate by reference the standard of review,
legal analysis, and authorities discussed in Reynolds.").
133. See R.J. Reynolds, 477 F.3d at 864; Philip Morris, 219 F. App'x at 405,409-10.
134. See R.J. Reynolds, 477 F.3d at 863-65; Philip Morris, 219 F. App'x at 405-06.
135. R.J. Reynolds, 477 F.3d at 864-65.
136. See Philip Morris, 219 F. App'x at 406 n.9, 406-09.





This Note argues that carefully analyzing the Court's opinion in Reeder-
Simco demonstrates that, despite the expansive dicta appearing in Part IV,
the Court did not intend to re-shape the course of its RPA jurisprudence in
any significant way. The Court's opinion operated well within the confines
of established RPA doctrine, even if its searching review of the evidence
presented at trial represented a rare foray into the arena of factual error cor-
rection. In light of the expansive interpretations that many commentators
adopted after Reeder-Simco, this Note surveyed citations to the opinion to
determine whether such broad readings of the case had taken hold in the
lower courts as well. The results show that courts have generally read the
opinion narrowly and continue to apply the Morton Salt Inference in secon-
dary-line RPA cases.
Although the critics of the RPA may well be correct that it reflects
"wholly mistaken economic theory,"'39 Congress clearly may choose to en-
act statutes reflecting values other than economic efficiency.'4 0 As counsel to
Reeder-Simco noted at oral argument, the Court adopted the Morton Salt
Inference as a gloss on the RPA's statutory text in 1948 and has repeatedly
affirmed its validity.14 Significant evidence in the RPA's legislative history
and the principle of stare decisis support retaining that interpretation until
Congress amends the statute.14 In the meantime, this Note's survey shows
that lower courts have interpreted Reeder-Simco narrowly, resisting the im-
pulse to rewrite the RPA, as many commentators seem to wish.
139. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 187 (2006) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 382 (The Free Press
1993) (1978)).
140. Laws regulating workplace safety, the minimum wage, or the environment offer several
examples. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 437, 471 (2001) ("The text of
§ 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its importance
to the [Clean Air Act] as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the [National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards]-setting process.").
141. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
142. Indeed, the Antitrust Modernization Commission, a body created by Congress in 2002,
recently published its final report and recommendations, which included an exhortation that "Con-
gress should repeal the Robinson-Patman Act in its entirety." ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 312, 317 (2007), available at http://www.amc.gov/
report-recommendation/amcjfinal-report.pdf. As it has done numerous times in the past, however,
Congress will likely ignore this recommendation. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 38 n. 13,
Reeder-Simco, 546 U.S. 164 (No. 04-905), 2005 WL 1801037 (citing several similar, prior recom-
mendations that ultimately went unheeded).
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